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The paper considers the pros and cons for Iceland adopting the euro as legal tender. The
current Icelandic monetary arrangements are contrasted both with a unilateral adoption of
the euro and with a full membership in the EMU. Microeconomic transactions costs
savings argue in favour of either form of monetary union. Loss of seignoirage revenues
does not seem to be an economic obstacle to either form of euroisation for Iceland. Loss
of the lender of last resort is, however, a powerful argument against unilateral monetary
union. The optimal currency area arguments (which concern the macroeconomic
stabilization aspects of a permanently fixed exchange rate) are unfavourable to a
unilateral monetary union, but the case against a full membership in the EMU is more
balanced. The extraneous instability and excess volatility inherent in a market-
determined exchange rate dominate the shock absorber properties of a flexible exchange
rate when financial markets are highly integrated. On balance, the economic arguments
favour a membership in the EMU, but not the unilateral adoption of the euro. Because
Iceland is not a member of the EU, the political arguments against any form of monetary
union are overwhelming. Without a EU membership, the transfer of national sovereignty
to the ECB would lack political legitimacy. The lack of institutions for ensuring the
political accountability of the ECB in Iceland means that euroisation of Iceland is
unlikely to happen, except as part of Icelandic membership in the EU. Euroisation
without a membership in the EU is simply unlikely to survive.
Keywords: Icelandic exchange rate regime, optimal currency area, seigniorage, lender of
last resort, central bank accountability
JEL: E42, E44, E52, E58, F33, F36, F41, G15, H77
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1. Introduction
Currency regimes are under review everywhere. Not only in transition economies, developing
countries and emerging market economies, but also in some of the most industrially advanced
countries of the world. On January 1, 1999, eleven of the fifteen EU members successfully
launched their common currency, the euro by pooling their national monetary sovereignties
in a common, supranational monetary sovereignty, institutionally expressed in a 'unitary'
supranational central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB), with the member national
central banks (nebs) reduced to a role rather like that of regional reserve banks in the Federal
Reserve System.
1
In view of these epochal changes taking place in Western Europe, it is not surprising
that the question as to what constitutes the appropriate exchange rate regime has been raised
also in Iceland. I will review the main issues that determine the answer to that question.
I will restrict the discussion to a comparison of just two currency regimes. The first is
a flexible or floating exchange rate with emphasis on price stability as the final goal of
monetary policy. The monetary policy regime in Iceland has gradually been evolving in this
direction (see Gunnarsson [1999]). Although the current Central Bank legislation mentions
several goals for monetary policy, the current consensus is that price stability should be the
main one. The intermediate target of monetary policy has been exchange rate stability
(stability of the effective exchange rate of the krona) within a pre-specified zone, currently
±9%. This choice of intermediate target appears to be a practical recognition of the fact that
in a highly open economy like Iceland, there is a close relationship between the external
value of the currency and the domestic price level. This, together with the fact that the
external value of the krona is more easily monitored on a day-to-day basis than its internal
purchasing power, can justify the pursuit of exchange rate stability as an intermediate target,
even if no intrinsic importance is attached to the external value of the currency.
                                                       
1 Technically, the national central banks are the shareholders of the ECB. The Maastricht and Amsterdam
treaties distinguish between the ECB and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the collective of the
ECB and the national central banks. In publications of the ECB and in public statements of its Executive Board
members, there are frequent references to the 'Eurosystem' (an obvious echo of the Federal Reserve System).
Each national central bank provides one member of the decision-making Governing Council of the ECB (which
consists of the 11 national central bank governors and 6 executive board members) and certain aspects of the
implementation of the centrally determined monetary policy are administratively decentralised through the nebs.
None of this detracts from the reality that the ECB/ESCB is a 'unitary' central bank. Monetary policy authority is
unambiguously centralised in Frankfurt and, the nebs have effectively become the regional branch banks of the
ECB.3
The second currency regime is a the adoption of the euro as the national currency.
Since Iceland is not a member of the European Union, EMU membership is ruled out.
Unilateral adoption of the euro as Iceland's national currency and legal tender is, however an
option. I will refer to this kind of monetary union as an asymmetric monetary union. Such
unilateral 'euroisation' would not provide a share of the seigniorage revenues of the common
currency area. There would be no automatic access to the discount window of the ECB.
Neither would the ECB have any lender of last resort responsibilities vis-à-vis the financial
institutions of Iceland. There would be no seat on the ECB Council or Executive Board and
monetary policy by the ECB would be conducted without any reference to Iceland's
economic conditions, unless this were in the national interest of Euroland, as perceived by the
ECB. This can be contrasted with a full and formal monetary union, what I will call a
(formally) symmetric monetary union.
2 With EU and EMU membership, Iceland would get
its fair share of the Euroland-wide seigniorage; financial institutions in Iceland would have
access to the discount window of the ECB on equal terms; the ECB would act as lender of
last resort on the same terms and conditions in all member nations, and the monetary policy
of the ECB would be directed at price stability and economic activity in Euroland as a whole,
which would give a small weight to Iceland.
There are many other possible arrangements. An adjustable currency peg vis-à-vis the
euro (or vis-à-vis a basket of currencies) is one. Another is a currency board, a legislatively
fixed exchange rate (presumably vis-à-vis the euro) with 100% reserve backing of domestic
currency issue. A third is a legislatively fixed exchange rate without 100% reserve backing of
domestic currency issue, that is, with scope for domestic credit expansion.
Even if we restrict ourselves to floating or flexible exchange rate regimes, there is a
wide range of possible objectives and at least two choices of monetary instruments to
consider. Single nominal targets, such as inflation targets or price level targets are one,
currently popular, option. Multiple targets, for instance an inflation target augmented with
output gap or unemployment objectives are other popular candidates.
3 The ordering of the
targets can either be lexicographic, as in the UK and in Euroland, or more symmetric, with
                                                       
2 Formal symmetry means that participating nation states share in the costs and benefits of the monetary union
in a way that represents their economic size or weight, and that their representation on the decision making
council of the supranational central bank (the ECB) likewise reflects their economic importance in the union.
Clearly, in a formally symmetric union between countries of very different economic size, the larger member(s)
will be the dominant partners.
3 The USA is unusual in having three targets: maximum employment, price stability and interest rate stability.4
non-zero weights attached to all objectives, as in the USA. The horizon over which the target
or targets are to be pursued can differ, as can the operational definition of the inflation target.
In a floating exchange rate world, there are two options as regards the choice of the
monetary instrument:
4 the monetary base and a short nominal interest rate. Changes in the
monetary base can have as their counterpart on the asset side of the central bank balance
sheet, either changes in external reserves or changes in domestic credit. In a world with
unrestricted international capital mobility, the composition of the asset side of the central
bank's balance sheet is irrelevant. Sterilised foreign exchange market intervention then has no
effect on anything, nominal or real. In practice, no central bank I know of has ever practised
monetary base control. The reason is that the velocity of circulation of the monetary base is
far too noisy to make the monetary base a desirable instrument of monetary control. This
leaves the cost of borrowing the monetary base, that is, the short risk-free nominal rate, as the
universal monetary instrument of choice.
Iceland has unrestricted international mobility of financial capital. In a world with
unrestricted financial capital mobility, and an imperfect capacity for commitment to the
defence of the external value of the currency, an adjustable peg is an accident waiting to
happen.
5 A legislatively fixed exchange rate (with or without the additional currency board
feature) is either not fully credible, in which case it is simply another version of an adjustable
peg, or it is fully credible, in which case it is an inferior substitute for full monetary union in
every respect except as regards some of the symbolic trappings of national sovereignty
(discussed in Section 3 below).
I approach the question about the pros and cons of Icelandic euroisation by asking
why the currency regime matters. In Section 2 I review the technical economic arguments for
and against a monetary union, starting with the microeconomic benefits of a common
medium of exchange and the microeconomic costs of the change-over. Next is the question of
seigniorage - the real resources appropriated by a national government through the issuance
of non-interest-bearing bearer liabilities. The third issue is systemic financial stability and the
role of the national central bank as the lender of last resort. The last economic issue is the
costs and benefits of national monetary sovereignty and exchange rate flexibility from the
point of view of macroeconomic stabilisation policy. This is the venerable subject of optimal
currency areas. Section 3 considers the political and constitutional arguments for and against
                                                       
4 I am restricting the discussion to market-based methods of monetary control. Credit rationing etc. are not
considered.
5 See Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [ 1998].5
monetary union: the substance and symbols of national sovereignty and the issue of
accountability of the monetary policy makers to the electorate. Section 4 concludes.
2. Why Does the Currency Regime Matter? Economic Arguments
2.1. The microeconomics of a common currency
The transactions cost saving advantages of a common currency are familiar. A medium of
exchange or transactions medium is subject to a network externality (Dowd and Greenaway
[1993]). The usefulness to me of a medium of exchange is increasing in the number of other
economic agents likely to accept it as a medium of exchange. By eliminating the need for the
exchange of one currency for another, real resource costs are saved. From a microeconomic
efficiency point of view, if one were to design the world from scratch, a single currency
would be adopted.
If the status quo is a situation in which there are multiple national currencies, the
permanent flow of transaction cost savings from having a common currency have to be
balanced against the one-off, up-front switch over costs of moving to a common currency.
Little can be said about the magnitude of the resource savings involved. Estimating them
from the spreads in the foreign exchange markets will understate the true cost because it
ignores the 'in-house' costs incurred by the non-bank parties in the foreign exchange
transactions. It overestimates the true costs to the extent that there are monopoly profits or X-
inefficiency in the foreign exchange markets.
In its report One market, one money (European Economy [1990]), the Commission of
the European Communities estimated the permanent flow of exchange transaction costs
savings at about 0.5 percent of GDP for the 15 member Community as a whole. Of course,
this exercise involved the abolition of 14 national currencies and their replacement by a
single currency. Icelandic euroisation would involve only the abolition of a single currency.
The foreign exchange transaction costs savings should also be augmented by the transactions
costs saved in transactions between instruments denominated in national currencies that
would be redundant if a common currency were adopted. E.g. switching from Icelandic
Treasury bills to euro-area Treasury bills would involve the sale of the Icelandic TBs, a
purchase of euros and the purchase of the euro area TBs. There would be three transactions,
and three sets of transaction costs. Foreign exchange market transaction costs are just one of
the three. One half of one percent of GDP (if that is a indeed a reasonable estimate) may not6
sound like much, but it is twice the maximal estimate of the amount of seigniorage Iceland
currently gets from note issuance (see Table 1 below).
The magnitude of the switching costs for Iceland are even harder to estimate. In the
case of EMU, competing estimates differed by one and sometimes two orders of magnitude.
The switching costs due to this form of bounded rationality do not just involve the
administrative and hardware cost of re-denominating all contracts, changing vending
machines etc. but also the psychological costs of having to compute prices with a new
numeraire.
A final microeconomic benefit from a common currency is the greater price
transparency it creates. Price discrimination and market segmentation are discouraged when
buyers can more easily engage in comparison shopping. Again, this argument relies on
bounded rationality, and the magnitude of these benefits is anyone's guess.
2.2. Seigniorage
There are several ways of measuring the resources appropriated by the state through the
issuance of non-interest-bearing liabilities. If both components of the monetary base
(currency and banks' balances with the central bank) are unremunerated a straightforward
measure of state revenue from the activities of the central bank is simply the change in the
monetary base. In Iceland reserves pay interest (although less than market rates), so the
seigniorage measures used here can only be viewed as upper-limit estimates.
To get a sense of magnitude, it is helpful to express this as a fraction of nominal GDP.
Letting Mt denote the nominal stock of base money at the end of period t, Pt the price level
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A related measure of the monetary revenue of the state is the inflation tax, the reduction in
the purchasing value of the outstanding stock of base money. I will refer to this as the
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The three measures are related. Let mt be the base money-GDP ratio
7 and gt the growth rate
of real GDP,
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Whatever the measure one uses, the revenues from the national printing presses are
small beer for Iceland. Table 1 provides some illustrative seigniorage figures for Iceland.
Seigniorage (the change in the stock of base money) has averaged 0.18% of GDP in the past
5 years. The interest bill foregone is slightly higher, averaging 0.28% of GDP over the past 5
years and the inflation tax is even lower, at 0.07% of GDP over the past 5 years. This reflects
the low ratio of currency to GDP in Iceland, averaging 3.6% of annual GDP in the past 5
years.















1994 3.7 0.25 0.06 0.27 0.06
1995 3.4 -0.73 -0.16 0.27 0.06
1996 3.9 3.64 0.75 0.31 0.09
1997 3.7 0.60 0.11 0.26 0.07
1998 3.5 0.89 0.15 0.27 0.06
Average 3.6 0.93 0.18 0.28 0.07
* Change in stock of base money over the previous year. 
** Interest rate is 1 year TB rate. 
*** Inflation rate is CPI
inflation rate.
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7 mt = Mt/PtYt.
8 Yt/Yt - 1 = (1 + gt).8
Neo-classical optimal public finance arguments suggest that, if the fiscal authorities
do not have non-distortionary taxes at their disposal, the distortionary inflation tax will be
used, together with all other distortionary taxes, in such a way as to minimise the inevitable
distortions and efficiency losses, now and in the future, associated with the financing of any
given public spending programme. If nations differ in the effectiveness of their tax
administration, different national inflation rates may be optimal. Even in the rarefied world of
these neo-classical public finance models, this argument is by no means robust. Money is an
asset, as well as a medium of exchange, and there is a considerable literature suggesting that,
at least in steady state, assets should not be taxed. Money can also be thought of as an
intermediate input in the process transforming primary inputs into goods and services
available for household consumption. There is another body of literature suggesting that
taxing intermediate inputs is undesirable.
Whatever the merits of this literature, the data make it clear that modern industrial
states with well-developed financial systems do not make use of the inflation tax to any
significant extent.
I conclude that loss of national discretion over seigniorage is not an economic
obstacle to monetary union in Iceland, even if this were to take the form of unilateral
euroisation. There would be no seigniorage loss at all if Iceland were to join EMU as a
member of the EU, which would ensure that Iceland would obtain a reasonable share of
Euroland seigniorage revenues.
The loss of national control over the national inflation rate could be more costly from
the point of view of the broadly defined inflation tax, which consists not only of the reduction
in the purchasing power of the national base money stock (the anticipated inflation tax) but
includes the reduction in the market value of all nominally denominated government debt,
including its interest-bearing liabilities (the unanticipated inflation tax). One can visualise
dire circumstances when the ability to impose a capital levy on the holders of nominal public
debt (especially longer-maturity debt) through an unexpected increase in the inflation rate
might be a valuable policy instrument. However, given the widespread use of indexed
government debt in Iceland this argument has less force.
2.3. Financial stability: the lender of last resort
The state has a unique responsibility for dealing with systemic financial instability. The
reason is that the state has deeper pockets than any private domestic agent. The state has the9
monopoly of the legitimate use of coercion and force. This is expressed through its power to
tax, to declare certain of its liabilities to be legal tender, and to regulate. The central bank is
the state agency with the short-term deep pockets, derived from its ability to issue legal
tender. If a financial crisis is not a short-lived phenomenon (a liquidity or rollover crisis), but
becomes a tong-term solvency crisis for a substantial part of the financial sector, the short-
term deep pockets of the central bank must be supplemented with the long-term deep pockets
of the ministry of finance. A central bank that attempts to recapitalise a sizeable chunk of a
bankrupt private financial sector's balance sheet would undermine its own solvency. Since the
central bank does not itself have the power to tax, central bank solvency could be safeguarded
only be continued monetary issuance, which would be inflationary. Non-inflationary
recapitalisation of a bankrupt financial system requires the resources of the state agency with
the long-term deep pockets: the ministry of finance with its power to tax.
To a minor extent, the lender of last resort function can be 'privatised', through deposit
insurance, the arranging of contingent credit lines etc. For truly systemic financial crises this
is inadequate.
If Iceland were to unilaterally adopt another country's currency (the euro, say) as its
national currency, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the central bank of the country
whose currency it has adopted will be willing to act as a lender of last resort for its financial
institutions. Unilateral euroisation of this kind therefore carries a very high price tag. The
discount window is closed forever and there is no lender of last resort.
2.4. Macroeconomic stabilisation: the theory of optimal currency areas revisited
My first maintained hypothesis in what follows is that the current Icelandic monetary
arrangement (a price stability target and an effective exchange rate stability intermediate
target) is capable of delivering, on average and in a sustained manner, an acceptably stable
rate of inflation compatible with most reasonable definitions of price stability. The record of
the last 10 years or so supports this assumption, as seen in Table 2, which also suggests that
this price stability has not been purchased at the cost of sustained lower growth or higher
unemployment.
9
                                                       
9 Targeting very low inflation does increase the risk that the economy will end up in a liquidity trap. For a
discussion of this issue see Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [1999].10
TABLE 2. Inflation, Growth and Unemployment in Iceland, 1991-1998
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
CPI inflation (%) 6.8 3.7 4.1 1.5 1.7 2.3 1.8 1.7
Real GNI growth (%) 3.2 -4.2 -0.9 2.7 1.9 4.8 6.2 6.9
Unemployment (%) 1.5 3.0 4.4 4.8 5.0 4.3 3.9 2.8
Source: Central Bank of Iceland and OECD.
Granted then that both the current regime and monetary union with the euro zone can deliver
price stability, the macroeconomic stability issue can be narrowed down to the question as to
which regime is more likely to stabilise the real economy, that is, which regime is more likely
to avoid or minimise deviations of unemployment from the natural rate or departures of
actual from capacity output.
My second maintained hypothesis is that the choice of exchange rate regime will have
no significant impact on the path of capacity output or on the natural rate of unemployment. I
therefore rule out a long-run non-vertical Phillips curve and hysteresis in the natural rate of
unemployment. Temporary real shocks only have temporary real effects. Nominal shocks,
whether temporary or permanent, are temporary real shocks in my world view. I recognise
that monetary shocks, to the extent that they affect investment decisions of any kind (or
through such features as overlapping, staggered nominal contracts), can have real effects that
may last longer than the nominal rigidities that are responsible for nominal shocks having any
real effects at all. I do however, maintain the assumption that money is neutral in the long
run. For practical purposes, we can take the long run to be two years.
How useful a stabilisation instrument is monetary policy, working through domestic
short nominal interest rates and a floating nominal exchange rate? What does a nation give
up, in terms of the ability to pursue macroeconomic stabilisation policy by surrendering
monetary sovereignty and joining a monetary union and how can it compensate for the loss of
the monetary instrument? These are the central questions that produced the theory of optimal
currency areas.
The theory of optimal currency areas (Mundell [1961], McKinnon [1963], Ingram
[1969], Kenen [1969], Masson and Taylor [1992]) is one of the low points of post-World
War II monetary economics. Its key failure is a chronic confusion between transitory nominal
rigidities and permanent real rigidities. The result is a greatly overblown account of the
power of monetary policy to affect real economic performance, for good or for bad.11
The optimal currency area literature asks which of a set of national (or regional)
economies each of which has its own national (regional) currency, would benefit from having
irrevocably fixed exchange rates with one or more of the other currencies. The following
characteristics of either the individual national economies or the multi-country system as a
whole, have been argued to favour retention of the national currency, and the associated
scope for nominal exchange rate flexibility.
(1) A high degree of nominal rigidity in domestic prices and/or costs.
(2) A high degree of openness to trade in real goods and services.
(3) A high incidence of asymmetric (nation-specific) shocks rather than symmetric or
common shocks and/or dissimilarities in national economic structures or transmission
mechanisms that causes even symmetric shocks to have asymmetric consequences.
(4) A less diversified structure of production and demand.
(5) A low degree of real factor mobility (especially labour mobility) across national
boundaries.
(6) Absence of significant international (and supra-national) fiscal tax-transfer mechanisms.
2.4.1. How important are nominal cost and price rigidities in Iceland?
If there are no significant nominal cost and price rigidities, the exchange rate regime is a
matter of supreme macroeconomic insignificance, Only the microeconomic transactions and
switch over costs matter. A country can be mired in real rigidities, and its real economic
performance will be miserable. Unless these real rigidities can be addressed effectively
through nominal exchange rate variations, its performance will be equally miserable with a
common currency, an independent national currency and a floating exchange rate, or with a
system of universal bilateral barter.
The severity and persistence of nominal rigidities therefore becomes a key empirical
and policy issue. Unfortunately, the available empirical evidence is extremely opaque and
very hard to interpret. Information on the duration of nominal wage and price contracts and
on the extent to which they are synchronised or staggered is subject to an obvious application
of the Lucas critique. These contracting practices are not facts of nature, but the outcomes of
purposeful choices. Changes in the economic environment conditioning these choices will
change the practices.
Testing price and wage data for persistence is equally unlikely to be enlightening. The
pattern of serial correlation in the data reflects both 'true' structural lags, invariant under12
changes in the economic environment, and expectational dynamics that will not be invariant
when the rules of the game are changed. There is no deep theory of nominal rigidities worth
the name. Menu cost theory assumes that there are real costs associated with changing the
prices of goods and services in terms of some numeraire. It does not explain why the
numeraire should be money (the means of payment and medium of exchange) or what the
consequences would be of a change in the numeraire. Economics has a hard enough time
motivating the use of a transactions medium. It has nothing to say about why the numeraire
matters. A theory of the numeraire would swiftly land us in the domain of bounded
rationality, an area where conventional economists are loath to tread.
This leaves the economics profession in an uncomfortable position. We believe the
numeraire matters, although we cannot explain why (using conventional economic tools). We
believe that nominal wage and price rigidities are common and that they matter for real
economic performance, but we do not know how to measure these rigidities, nor how stable
they are likely to be under the kind of policy regime changes that are under discussion.
2.4.2. Is Iceland too small and/or too open to benefit from exchange rate flexibility?
A common theme in most optimal currency area approaches is that an economy that is more
open to trade in goods and services will lose less when it gives up its national currency. It
should be obvious that this proposition cannot be correct as stated. An economy that is
completely closed to trade in goods and services neither gains nor loses from a
macroeconomic stabilisation point of view when it adopts a common currency. If there is a
relationship between degree of openness and the cost of giving up exchange rate flexibility,
the relationship cannot be monotone.
A small open economy cannot use variations in its nominal exchange rate to affect its
international terms of trade. If all final goods and services as well as all intermediate goods
and services and raw materials are traded internationally, and if the country is small (a price-
taker in the global markets), changes in the nominal exchange rate also will not affect the
relative price of traded and non-traded goods (the 'real exchange rate'). However, labour
services are unlikely to be internationally traded on a scale sufficient to have the domestic
price of labour determined as the product of the exogenous world price of labour and the
nominal exchange rate. With labour non-traded, nominal wage rigidities are sufficient to give
the nominal exchange rate a (temporary) handle on the real economy, through its ability to
influence relative labour costs and profitability.13
Iceland is a very small economy, but not an unusually open one, as measured by
imports and exports to GDP ratios. Exports were 34.6% of GDP in 1998 and imports 38.5%.
This is slightly higher than the corresponding figures for the UK but significantly lower that
such countries as the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark. Iceland probably has no power to
affect its external terms of trade. Its relative price of traded to non-trade goods certainly can
be influenced by policy and the presence of immobile labour and nominal wage rigidity
means that policy can also influence relative unit labour costs. Potentially therefore, the
nominal exchange rate is a stabilisation instrument.
2.4.3. Is Iceland subject to asymmetric shocks that make monetary union with Euroland
especially costly?
The 'one-size fits all' monetary policy corset inflicted on all members of a monetary union is
most costly to a member state if it is subject to especially severe asymmetric shocks or if its
structure is such as to cause even symmetric or common shocks to have seriously asymmetric
impacts on output and employment. The proposition that a monetary union is more attractive
when the structure of production and demand is well-diversified should be seen as a
statement about the conditions under which asymmetric shocks are less likely.
It is true that giving up nominal exchange rate flexibility would deprive Iceland of a
mechanism for responding to asymmetric shocks. While nominal exchange rate flexibility
does not reduce the long-term pain of changing relative costs or prices, it can, if used
properly, reduce the transitional costs of achieving the real adjustment that is required. How
serious this loss is depends on how well, in practice, this mechanism has been used.
A frequently heard argument is that Iceland is likely to be subject to asymmetric
supply shocks. This is because it has a large primary sector (fishing) that is subject to
'technological' shocks such as random variations in fish stocks, and to global price shocks to
the price of fish. This is clearly a relevant consideration. Two point should be noted however.
First, the fisheries sector, while clearly important, is not that large a share of total economic
activity. The occupational distribution figures for 1996 indicated that 5.1% of the working
population was engaged in Fisheries and another 6.0% in Fisheries processing. The two
sectors together produced 14.4% of GDP in 1997, provided 71% of merchandise exports and
49% of total exports. About 40% of Iceland's international trade was with Euroland in 1997.
The supply shocks argument presumably applies with reference to Fisheries only, not with14
reference to Fisheries processing, which is just a form of manufacturing.
10 Second, it should
be noted, that a flexible exchange rate can be a source of domestic price shocks (for given
world fish prices) as well as a means of responding to changes in the world price of fish.
There are two further considerations that qualify the practical importance of the
asymmetric shocks argument in favour of retaining nominal exchange rate flexibility.
Nominal exchange rate changes are the appropriate response only to asymmetric shocks to
the markets for goods and services, that is, to IS shocks and aggregate supply shocks. In
response to asymmetric monetary shocks (LM shocks), a constant nominal interest rate is
appropriate. In a world with perfect international financial capital mobility, a constant
nominal interest rate translates into a constant expected rate of exchange rate depreciation. A
fixed exchange rate is one way of delivering this optimal response to LM shocks.
11
Second, it is important not to be excessively impressed with the efficiency of financial
markets in general, and with the efficiency of the foreign exchange market in particular. Most
of the time, the foreign exchange market is technically efficient, in the sense that large
transactions can be made almost instantaneously, at very low transactions costs and with a
minimal impact on the exchange rate.
12 Even if the foreign exchange market is technically
efficient (in the weak, semi-strong or even the strong sense) and no risk-adjusted pure profits
can be made, the price established in this technically efficient market may not convey the
right social scarcity valuation. Rational speculative bubbles can cause an asset price like the
exchange rate to differ from its fundamental valuation. Departures from technical efficiency
also are common. Herding instinct, bandwagon effects and other irrational behaviour, noise
traders, panic traders and traders caught in a liquidity squeeze in other financial market make
for excessive volatility and sometimes quite persistent misalignments in the foreign exchange
markets.
The foreign exchange market and the exchange rate can therefore be a source of
extraneous shocks as well as a mechanism for adjusting to fundamental shocks. One cannot
have the one without the other. The potential advantages of nominal exchange rate flexibility
as an effective adjustment mechanism are bundled with the undoubted disadvantages of
excessive noise and unwarranted movements in the exchange rate, inflicting unnecessary real
                                                       
10 By the same token, one would calibrate the impact of an oil price shock by the size of the oil extracting and
oil exploration sectors, not including the oil refining and processing sectors.
11 This is a straightforward extension of Poole [1970] to an open economy setting with integrated global
financial markets (see Buiter [1997]).
12 Like other financial markets, the foreign exchange markets denote at times beset by "disorderly market
conditions", in which spreads widen to the point that transactions dry up and the market ceases to be efficient,
even in the narrow technical sense.15
adjustments on the rest of the economy. It is by no means clear that the advantages of
nominal exchange rate flexibility when faced with fundamental asymmetric shocks dominate
its disadvantages as a source of extraneous asymmetric shocks.
2.4.4. Is limited real resource mobility an obstacle to euroisation?
It is clear that a high degree of real factor mobility can be an effective substitute for nominal
exchange rate adjustments in the face of asymmetric shocks. Indeed, factor mobility permits
long-term, even permanent real adjustments to asymmetric real shocks, something nominal
exchange flexibility cannot deliver.
The real factors whose mobility matters are labour and real capital. Real capital
mobility is limited, even when financial capital mobility is perfect. Once real capital (plant,
machinery and other equipment, infrastructure etc.) is installed, it becomes hard to shift
geographically. There are some examples of 'flying capital', such as Jumbo jets and of mobile
real capital (such as fishing vessels), and there have been examples of whole factories being
shipped over great distances by rail, but as a first approximation, real capital cannot be
relocated. New gross investment can of course be redirected across national boundaries, and
financial capital mobility can facilitate this process, by permitting the decoupling of national
saving and gross domestic capital formation. This is not a process that is likely to be very
significant at cyclical frequencies, however, Moving the real capital stock between Iceland
and Euroland through variations in gross investment flows is therefore unlikely to be an
effective substitute for the short-term stabilisation potential of nominal exchange rate
movements.
A similar point can be made about international labour mobility. With Iceland being a
member of the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement between the EU, on the one hand,
and Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, on the other, the legal ability of labour to move
between Iceland and the EU are about the same as between any two member states of the EU.
However, since migration is costly (within as well as between nations) it is unlikely
that labour mobility could mimic the impact of variations in the nominal exchange rate.
Workers are only likely to move if the fixed, up-front cost of moving is compensated for by a
long period of higher earnings in the country of destination. Permanent (or at least persistent)
real shocks will trigger labour mobility. Nominal exchange rate flexibility only affects the
real economy for a short transition period. To mimic the effect of nominal exchange rate
flexibility, net cross-border migration flows would have to be reversible and significant at
cyclical frequencies. It is hard to see that happening.16
I conclude that cross-border mobility of real capital and of labour between Iceland and
Euroland is unlikely to be an effective substitute for nominal exchange rate flexibility.
However, I doubt that even within existing currency unions (like the USA or Euroland), net
interregional migration flows are quantitatively important at cyclical frequencies. This means
one of two things. Either, these existing currency unions are not optimal currency areas or an
optimal currency area does not require a high degree of labour mobility at cyclical
frequencies.
2.4.5. Is a strong supranational federal fiscal authority necessary to compensate for the loss
of the exchange rate instrument?
The brief answer is 'no'. Fiscal stabilisation policy works if and to the extent that postponing
taxes, and borrowing to finance the resulting revenue shortfall, boosts aggregate demand.
This will be the case either if there is myopia among consumers, who fail to realise that the
present value of current and future taxes need not be affected by the timing of taxes, or if
postponing taxes redistributes resources between households with different propensities to
consume. In overlapping generations models without an operative intergenerational gift
motive, postponing taxes redistributes resources from the young to the old and from
generations yet to be born to generations already alive. This will boost aggregate
consumption in the short run. Intracohort heterogeneity (say through the coexistence of life-
cycle consumers and current disposable income constrained consumers) can reinforce these
effects.
Unless the supranational Federal Fiscal Authority in a currency union has access to
the financial markets on terms that are superior to those enjoyed by the national fiscal
authorities, there is nothing the Federal authorities can achieve by way of fiscal stabilisation
that cannot be achieved equally well by national or even lower-tier fiscal authorities. National
government financial deficits and surpluses, probably mirrored to some extent in national
current account imbalances, are a perfect substitute for supranational fiscal stabilisation.
There have been a number of recent studies trying to determine the redistributive and
insurance properties of Federal tax-transfer systems. A study by Bayoumi and Masson
[1993], building on earlier work by Sala-i-Martin and Sachs [1992], analyses regional flows
of federal taxes and transfers within the US and Canada. They try to distinguish between
long-term fiscal flows (the redistributive element) and short-term responses to regional
business cycles, which they identify with the stabilisation element. They find that in the US,
long-run flows amount to 22 cents in the dollar while the stabilisation element is 31 cents in17
the dollar. For Canada, the corresponding figures are 39 cents and 17 cents respectively.
While interesting, these studies tell us nothing of relevance to the issue of whether fiscal
policy in a North American Monetary Union could compensate for the loss of the exchange
rate instrument. The long-term redistribution properties of the budget are irrelevant, because
the nominal exchange rate is not an instrument for long-term redistribution. The stabilisation
properties of the fiscal system do matter, but the necessary stabilisation can be provided at the
supranational, national or subnational level. The fact that the EU has only a tiny budget and
that Iceland, as a non-member, would have no access to it in any case, is therefore not a
relevant consideration in determining the pros and cons of euroisation.
It is true that, to the extent that monetary union is part of a wider process of political
integration, the political pressures may grow for long-term redistribution among the nations
that constitute the monetary union. What the redistribution figures in the studies of Bayoumi
and Masson and of Sala-i-Martin an Sachs tell us, is the degree to which the United States
and Canada are societies, rather than just economies, and the extent to which notions of
national solidarity are translated into redistributive measures through the tax-transfer
mechanism.
I conclude that Iceland's exclusion from the Euroland tax-transfer mechanism (such as
it is) is not a technical, economic obstacle to euroisation.
3. Political and Constitutional Aspects of Monetary Union
Monetary union is not just a technical economic, financial or monetary issue. It represents a
very significant constitutional and political change. Monetary union raises two distinct but
related political and constitutional issues: first the legitimacy of the surrender of national
sovereignty involved in euroisation, and second the accountability of the monetary policy
makers to the electorate or its elected representatives.
3.1. National sovereignty
Monetary union represents a surrender of national sovereignty to a supranational entity, This
is true even for the full, formally symmetric monetary union. A central bank is a key agent of
the state. The ability to issue legal tender is an expression of the power of the state to coerce,
to prescribe and proscribe behaviour. The common use of the term 'seigniorage' to refer to the
revenues accruing to the state through its monopoly of legal tender is a reminder of the fact18
that the power to issue legal tender is a manifestation of the state's ability to tax. A nation that
joins a monetary union surrenders its national sovereignty in the monetary domain and
becomes subject to a supranational form of sovereignty. The nation state is weakened by this
surrender of monetary sovereignty. I am not expressing myself on whether this would be a
good thing or a bad thing for Iceland.
13 I am merely reporting the fact.
The sober reality of this partial surrender of national sovereignty is complicated by
the strong symbolic significance often attached to the national currency. The irreducible
minimal list of symbols that define a nation as a nation state include a national currency,
along with an anthem and a flag. The emotions that are kindled when the abolition of the
national currency is under discussion go beyond what can be rationalised in terms of concerns
about the loss of national discretion in the use of seigniorage or the loss of the national
monetary stabilisation instrument.
These constitutional issues are very clear in the case of EMU. Economic and
Monetary Union in Europe is part of an ongoing process of economic and political integration
in Europe, and not an isolated, 'technical', monetary arrangement. In this it differs from
arrangements like the classical gold standard, which flourished between 1880 and 1914, the
heyday of European imperialism and nationalism. EMU is foremost a major step on the road
to 'ever closer union' in Europe. It represents the opening of a new chapter in the European
federalist agenda, a significant transfer of national sovereignty to a supra-national institution.
Like EMU, Icelandic euroisation would involve a transfer of national sovereignty to
the central or federal level. Unless this transfer of power is perceived as legitimate by the
citizens of Iceland, this transfer of authority to the ECB will be challenged by those who
perceive themselves to be adversely affected by it. In the past, common currency
arrangements, including a supranational central banking system with centralised authority,
have survived only when, at the time of their creation, a stronger and more legitimate federal
government structure was in place than is currently the case in the EMU area. A fortiori, past
common currency arrangements have been supported by a level of political integration way
beyond the (minimal) level that currently exists between Iceland and the EU.
14 The EU has,
at present, only a very weak, proto-confederal set-up, but it does have a Parliament, a Court
and a proto-executive, made up of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Icelandic
                                                       
13 In the context of European monetary integration, I have been an enthusiastic supporter of the surrender of
national sovereignty involved in EMU. The reason is overwhelmingly political: fear and loathing of the
unparalleled destructive capacities of European nationalism.
14 I do not consider NAFTA, a regional free trade arrangement, to have any serious supranational institutional
content.19
euroisation would not be supported by any supranational political legitimising structures. For
that reason alone, I very much doubt it could survive. Adopting the euro only to abandon it
again at some later date would be messy and disruptive.
The track record of past monetary unions is instructive. For instance, monetary union
in the USA was not complete until long after political unification. While one can make
allowances for the war period (1776-1783) and for the Confederation period (1783-1789),
even the USA monetary union created with the signing of the Constitution in 1789, was far
from complete. While the constitution gave the Congress the monopoly of coinage and of the
regulation of its value, the states continued to be able to charter commercial banks and to
regulate their note issuance. Until the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1914, the
USA did not have a central bank, although the First Bank of the U.S. (1791-1811) and the
Second Bank of the U.S. (1816-1836) can perhaps be characterised as proto central banks.
15
A monetary union with a centralised authority really did not exist in the USA until the
Banking Act of 1935.
Italian monetary unification occurred in 1862, with the introduction of a new unified
coinage system, based on the Sardinian lira, after political unification had been completed in
1861.
16 Centralisation of note and coin issuance and of other central bank functions did not
occur until 1893.
The history of German monetary and political union in the 19
th century is open to two
very different interpretations. The political establishment of the German Reich in 1871,
following the Franco-Prussian war, preceded the coinage acts of 1871 and 1873, which
unified coinage throughout the Reich and introduced the mark and the unit of account. In
1875, the new Reichsbank (a relabelling of the Prussian bank) became the de facto central
bank of the Reich. In practice, it monopolised the issuance of notes. In 1875 Germany went
on the gold standard (Germany used the Franco-Prussian War indemnity of 1870 to finance
the creation of a gold standard - an early example of the use of Regional Funds to facilitate
monetary integration perhaps). This sequence of events suggests that political unification in
Germany preceded monetary union.
Against that, the customs union (Zollverein) of 1834 was followed by the Munich
Coin Treaty of 1837 and the Dresden Coinage Convention of 1838, which created a double
currency standard among all members of the Zollverein (which included most members of
                                                       
15 The Federal Reserve Act was signed into law on 23 December 1913.
16 Venetia was incorporated in 1866. The Papal States followed in 1870, when the French were otherwise
engaged and could not intervene to protect their independence.20
the Deutscher Bund). The 1857, the Vienna Coinage Treaty joined Austria to the Dresden
arrangement. On this reading, most of the key steps towards German monetary unification
were taken before political unification. It should, however, be noted, that Austria left the
Vienna arrangement in 1867 following defeat in its war with Prussia. It did not join the
German Reich in 1871.
German political re-unification in 1990 coincided with monetary union between the
former West and East Germanies (GEMU). This is not an event with any clear implications
for EMU, since GEMU was little more than a take-over of a near-bankrupt East Germany by
West Germany.
There have been exceptions to the rule that political unification precedes monetary
union. Even if one ignores the ambiguous German 19
th century experience, the seven
provinces that formed the Dutch Republic established a monetary union with only the
weakest (con)federal political institutions and with almost completely decentralised fiscal
authority. It lasted for two centuries, until the conquest of the Republic by Napoleon
(Dormans [1991]).
Belgium and Luxembourg were in a monetary union from 1922 until they were both
absorbed in Euroland in 1999. While this association is more akin to a union between an
elephant and a mouse (and belongs in the France-Andorra, France-Monaco, Italy-Vatican
City, Italy-San Marino, Switzerland-San Marino category), it is interesting that monetary
union did not lead to far-reaching political integration between Belgium and Luxembourg.
Slightly different in nature are the currency unions adopted by contiguous former
colonies following independence. The CFA Franc Zone, set up in 1959 by thirteen former
French colonies in west and central Africa, survives till this day, although the CFA franc was
devalued by 50 percent in 1994. The survival of the arrangement appears to owe much to the
continued involvement of (and budgetary transfers from) France. The East Caribbean
Currency Area, consisting of 7 former British colonies, has survived since 1966, unlike the
East African Currency Area between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania which lasted only from
1966 until 1977.
Monetary unions that occurred without prior political unification and that did not
subsequently lead to political unification, have not survived. Examples include the following.
The Latin Monetary Union among France, Belgium, Switzerland and Italy, which
lasted (with some temporary suspensions of convertibility by individual members) from 1865
until, de facto, World War I. The official time of death was 1927.21
The Scandinavian monetary union among Sweden, Denmark and Norway, which
lasted from 1873 till de facto, World War I, although the arrangements was not officially put
out of its misery until 1924.
Attempts by 'successor states' to maintain monetary union following the break-up of a
larger political entity, have been short-lived, with the possible exception of the 'monetary
union' between the UK and Ireland (a currency board arrangement for Ireland, rather than a
"symmetric" monetary union), which lasted from 1922 till 1979.
Examples of spectacular failures to maintain a common currency following a political
break-up include the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire following the defeat of
the Habsbourg empire in World War I; the ill-fated rouble zone among 11 CIS members
between 1991 and mid-1993, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and the collapse
of the monetary union among the successor states to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
which dissolved in 1991.
17 All three political break-ups lead to hyperinflation.
Czechoslovakia broke up as a political union on January 1, 1993; the Czech-Slovak
monetary union collapsed on February 8, 1993 (Fidrmuc and Horvath [1998]). Here the
political and monetary break-up was not accompanied by hyperinflation.
I have considerable sympathy for the long-standing German position that, in the
context of European Economic and Monetary Union, further political integration should have
accompanied (or even preceded) monetary union.
18 On the other hand, the whole European
integration experiment, from the Coal and Steel Community on, has been a political wolf
dressed in economic sheep's clothing. It has been successful so far, and it may well continue
to be so.
19 It is essential, however, that the European Parliament, backed by the European
Court and the Ombudsman, act as an effective watchdog over the ECB. The legitimacy of the
ECB will depend on the extent to which it is effectively accountable to the European
Parliament. There would be no counterpart, if Iceland unilaterally adopted the euro, the
European Parliament, the European Court and the Ombudsman. The transfer of national
sovereignty involved in unilateral Icelandic euroisation would therefore not be perceived as
legitimate.
                                                       
17 Ukraine left the rouble zone in 1992. Tajikistan did not establish its own currency until 1995.
18 See e.g. Tietmeyer [1998a,b]. For a general discussion see Eichengreen [1996].
19 There have been times, however, that the economics got too far ahead of the politics. The Werner Group's
recommendation in 1970 of full monetary union by 1980 clearly was a bridge too far at the time.22
3.2. Accountability of the monetary authority following euroisation
Monetary policy today is made by operationally independent central banks. The targets or
objectives of the central bank should, of course, be politically determined. In an open,
democratic society, the delegation of policy making powers to non-elected officials will only
be accepted as legitimate by the citizens, if the independent central bank is accountable to the
elected representatives. Accountability requires openness and transparency. The objective or
objectives of the central bank must be clear and unambiguous. This is essential if the
electorate and its elected representatives are to be able to judge the performance of the central
bank.
The need for openness and transparency also applies to the procedures of the central
bank. Individual voting records of the members of the central bank's decision making Council
should be in the public domain. So should the minutes of its meetings. More elaborate and in-
depth analyses of the Council's thinking (like the Bank of England's quarterly inflation report
and inflation forecast) should be published regularly. An independent body (like the Non-
Executive Directors of the Court of the Bank of England) should vet the procedures of the
central bank and its Council on a regular basis, and should have the power to make binding
recommendations.
This procedural openness and accountability is essential for two reasons. First, it is the
only effective instrument of quality control for an operationally independent central bank.
Second, openness, transparency and accountability of any agent of the state is a political
public good.
At the core of effective accountability is the need for the Council members,
collectively and individually, to justify themselves before a duly constituted parliamentary
committee. In the US, the Governor of the Fed appears periodically before the Congress. In
Euroland, the Subcommittee on Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament is charged with
the political supervision of the ECB. In the UK, committees of both the House of Commons
and the House of Lords call Monetary Policy Committee members to appear on a regular
basis to explain their actions.
20
Following unilateral euroisation by Iceland, there would be no parliament that could
enforce effective accountability of the ECB. Even if Iceland were to get a seat on the ECB
                                                       
20 In the UK, there is a further dimension of political accountability. If the inflation rate departs from the
politically mandated target by more than 1% in either direction, the Governor of the Bank of England has to
write an open letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In that letter he has to explain why the departure from
the target happened, what the MPC proposes to do about it, over what time horizon it expects to be back on
track and how all this is consistent with the MPC's mandate.23
Council (in violation of the Amsterdam and Maastricht Treaties), the Parliament of Iceland
would only be able to call its representative to account. The non-Icelandic majority on the
ECB Council would be under no obligation to answer to the elected representatives of the
citizens of Iceland The European Parliament could hardly be expected to act in loco parentis
for the Icelandic Parliament on monetary matters. Such an arrangement would not, in my
view, be acceptable to the citizens of Iceland (nor to those of Euroland).
4. Conclusion
I conclude that the economic case for unilateral Icelandic euroisation is unconvincing. The
economic case for adopting the euro would be more nearly balanced, if the monetary union in
question were a full, formally symmetric monetary union. This would give Iceland a
reasonable share of Euroland seigniorage. It would also have the ECB assume full lender of
last resort responsibilities for Icelandic financial institutions. The ECB would define its price
stability and other economic objectives with reference to the entire Euroland economy. This
would, of course, be a token benefit only, given Iceland's tiny weight in the Euroland
economy. Finally, it would give Iceland a voice and a vote on the ECB's decision-making
council. Unilateral 'euroisation', where a 'peripheral' country simply adopts the currency of
another ('centre') nation, without a fair share of the common seigniorage, without access to
the discount window and other lender of last resort facilities, and without a voice in the
decision making processes of the centre's central bank should be of interest only to a
chronically mismanaged economic basket case, whose only hope of achieving monetary
stability is to unilaterally surrender monetary sovereignty. Iceland does not belong in that
category.
The political arguments against unilateral euroisation are overwhelming. The absence
of effective political institutions encompassing both Iceland and Euroland would mean that
there could be no effective political accountability of the ECB. The surrender of political
sovereignty inherent in euroisation would therefore not be perceived as legitimate by a
politically sophisticated citizenry.
Critics of EMU have pointed out that the EMU is a small, flightless bird, that survives
precariously in an arid environment. I actually believe that the EMU will fly, and that it will
prosper, because it is part of an ongoing process of political unification in Europe. Icelandic24
euroisation, however, will not fly, except as part of a wider political movement towards far-
reaching political integration, that is, Icelandic membership in the EU and in EMU.
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